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R U S S E L L A S T L E Y 
T HE Merchant of Venice bases its dramatic logic on the New Testament premise that you get what you give, and the play's consistent enactment of this looking-glass 
logic creates a world i n which mir ror ing is a major internal 
principle of order. This makes for a rather peculiar 
play-world: a providential world where reversal (the last 
made first) and reflexiveness (the judge self-judged) rule; a 
world which offers at any moment to confound subject wi th 
object and appearance wi th reality; a world, that is to say, 
oddly a k i n to Alice 's Looking-glass Garden, where you 
approach your goal by advancing i n the opposite direction. 
The three m a i n lines of action — the casket-, bond-, and 
ring-plots — form portions of this reflexive uni ty, each an 
analogue of the others, helping to clarify them and the 
meaning of the whole. 
The play as moral mirror of a human nature external to it; 
the necessity of moral r i sk- taking: these two ideas are 
famil iar enough to students of The Merchant of Venice. In this 
essay however I want to propose a more int imate and 
somewhat different connection between them and to show 
wi th what persistence both are implicated i n the internal 
mir ror ing just mentioned. I w i l l suggest also that 
Shakespeare i n this play confronts not only his dramatis 
personae but perhaps his audience as wel l wi th the moral r isk 
of self-judgment through judging the other and, further, that 
this dramatic (or supradramatic) si tuation could be achieved 
only by a playwright self-consciously w i l l i n g to put his own 
craft at hazard. Portia's arts too, mi r ror ing her creator's, w i l l 
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be seen to exploit the shifts of self-reflexiveness for moral 
ends. A n d the end of my argument should be to rediscover 
under a new l ight the famil iar t ruth that i n such a world of 
fearful Chr i s t i an symmetries — a world which I th ink meant 
to embrace playwright and audience as wel l as the play's 
internal characters — the choice between real and apparent 
goods is always consequential and inescapably hazardous. 
I 
Shylock's tale of Jacob and Laban and Antonio's response to 
i t tu rn on thoughts of hazard and consequence. The standard 
argument against usury had i t that legitimate wealth could 
be generated only by r i sk of wealth or by physical labor. Since 
the usurer avoided both (his loans were guaranteed), his 
profits were p la in ly i l legi t imate. Ye t according to Shylock 
Jacob's profit is just such a riskless consequence not of labor 
but of magical know-how, and he nevertheless "was blest". So 
Shylock the usurer — to put this i n a way that should seem 
more relevant as the present essay unfolds — sees i n this 
patr iarchal exemplar only his own reflection. Antonio on the 
other hand reads there only the pattern of a Chr i s t i an 
merchant. H i s Jacob is no more a laborer than Shylock's but 
he is no sorcerer either and deserves no personal credit for his 
good fortune, which is rather the result of a r isk, a "venture" 
much l ike Antonio's own: Jacob's luck is to Antonio's mind a 
th ing "swayed and fashioned by the hand of heaven" (I. i i i . 
88-90). 1 For Antonio, following Chr i s t i an tradit ion, recognizes 
i n Fortune, who seems to shuffle the world's goods b l indly and 
randomly, a mere persona of omniscient providence, an agent 
of the divine w i l l . I th ink the play supports only Antonio's 
interpretation. 
The casket choice wi l led by Portia's father also is spoken of 
as an affair of 'Tortune," a "venture," but often i n a sense 
opposed to Antonio's. Morocco, for example, frets about being 
led by "bl ind fortune" and complains that even Hercules 
might be beaten at a game of chance. Y e t the happy outcome 
of the contest makes i t dramatical ly clear that old Belmont's 
quaint device was very providently designed. "Who chooses 
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his meaning chooses" Por t ia , and she is i n fact won by the 
only suitor whose love transcends narcissism. For Belmont's 
law, l ike the Chr i s t i an God's, is fulfil led only by such love. 
R i sk is indeed part of what must be chosen. B u t r i sk i n this 
context is not reliance on accident, on pagan and arbitrary 
Chance (Sors), but again the gamble of faith understood by 
Antonio. The leaden demand to "give and hazard a l l " 
expresses a k ind of wisdom, the reversal of worldly values, 
which is folly to pagans (and to Roman Catholics i n the 
Reformers' view) and a stone of s tumbling to the Jews. 
Belmont's caskets are the mirrors which first expose the 
reflexive hazards of judging. Each chooser chooses his own 
self-image; what he gets (win or lose) is a glimpse of a truer 
self, of character as personal destiny. Aragon wishes to see 
himself uni ronical ly as a worldly wiseman but, l ike his name 
and nation, his zeal to get what he deserves reflects only 
obtuse arrogance. "There be fools alive iwis , I Si lvered o'er, 
and so was this" jibes his scroll (II. ix . 67-8) and the point is 
sharpened i f Aragon himself displays the si lver thatch of age 
without its wisdom. Morocco is described i n the or iginal stage 
direction as a "tawny" — golden rather than black — Moor, 
and he proclaims part of his self-image i n rejecting base lead: 
" A golden mind stoops not to shows of dross" (II. v i i . 20). 
Launcelot's later punning on the noun "Moor" and the 
comparative adjective "more" (III. v. 41-3) may further help 
interpret this emulous chooser of desire: because "enough/ 
M a y not extend so far as to the lady," the Moor wants more 
(II. v i i . 27-8). H e is sensual, ambitious, aggressive; but from 
Belmont's Chr i s t i an perspective physical potency wins only 
physical death. 
Whereas the choosers of externals mirror both physically 
and spir i tual ly the images they approve, the r ichly-at t ired 
Bassanio, who chooses "not by the view," is physical ly no 
"lead casket." 2 Ye t he unmistakeably does choose a reflection 
of his own values when he chooses to "give and hazard a l l . " 
This is his motto from the first to the last scene of the play. To 
Antonio he is frank about the element of hazard i n his p lan to 
w i n Por t ia , and he gives to the Gobbos and r ight after to 
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Gratiano as readily as Antonio and later Por t ia give to h i m 
(II. i i i . 142, 173). If he never needs squarely to face the 
ul t imate generosity, forgiving an enemy (as Shylock and 
Antonio must), he nevertheless lives by the teaching of the 
Sermon on the Mount that enjoins Chris t ians to "Give to h i m 
that asketh." 3 B u t this strength, unconscious of i ts l imi ts , 
turns to weakness, as Por t ia i n A c t F i v e leads h i m to 
understand. Bassanio's glimpse of his essential self, his soul's 
destiny, is the lead casket's picture of Por t i a . 4 
The casket contest is at least as consequential and 
hazardous for Por t ia as for any of her suitors. Her 
predicament at first glance may seem just the converse of 
theirs. They must choose, she must not; bad luck for them 
means they must not marry no matter how much they want 
to, for her that she must no matter how much she wants not 
to. B u t Shakespeare uses most of her introductory scene to 
establish that Por t ia too makes a choice. F r o m her wit ty 
scourging of the first parcel of wooers and her embarrassed 
delight when Nerissa trips her into b lur t ing Bassanio's name 
we gather that Por t ia is far from indifferent to the contest's 
outcome. She is no fairy-tale automaton: submission to her 
father's w i l l means curbing a strong w i l l of her own (I. i i . 
23-4). She is after a l l herself "lord" of Belmont now (HI. i i . 
167-9) and could, as Nerissa incidental ly reminds her, refuse 
to perform [her] father's w i l l " (I. i i . 90-92). A n d Jessica's 
example reminds us of the same possibility. When instead 
Por t ia chooses obedience she too chooses a version of the lead 
casket. She accepts self-renunciation and the r isk of faith: 
faith i n her father's love and wisdom and, as inevitable 
consequence of this, faith that i f the man she loves loves her, 
he too w i l l make the r ight choice (III. i i . 41). 
The hazardous necessity of consequential choice is the 
play's recurr ing moral predicament. It reflects an irony of the 
human condition mediated for Shakespeare's culture by the 
myth of Adam's choice and its consequences. The inevi tabi l i ty 
of hamartia was one of these consequences, from which i t 
followed that a l l human decisions, no matter how resolute or 
thoroughly calculated, ought to preserve some margin of faith 
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i n a providential grace. 5 Or otherwise put: a l l our choices are 
risks. 
II 
When the Prince of Aragon chooses desert he discovers 
himself a fool; for i n the words of a wiser prince, "treat every 
man after his desert and who shal l scape whipping?" 6 Desert 
is mere justice, as Por t ia warns Shylock at the t r i a l . 
Though justice be thy plea, consider this, 
That in the course of justice, none of us 
Should see salvation. 
(IV. i . 196-9) 
The issue raised by the si lver casket, i n other words, is 
assimilated here as elsewhere i n Shakespeare to the 
Reformation antithesis of justification by human merit and 
justification by divine grace. 7 
Shylock, we have seen, judges Jacob's profit i n lambs 
riskless and deserved, rejecting Antonio's interpretation of i t 
as a gift of providence. Likewise i n court, sensing no r i sk and 
feeling no need of grace, Shylock stands secure on his own 
righteousness under law: "What judgment shal l I dread, doing 
no wrong?" St. P a u l identifies this attitude as an aspect of 
what he sees as a k ind of fundamental "Jewish heresy," the 
confidence that one has no need of Christ 's purchase of grace 
i f one is already performing to the letter the law of Moses. B u t 
Shylock's bond condemns Shylock himself to death, and i f he 
had been merciful the life saved would also have been his 
own. Obviously, l ike Belmont's caskets, the law too is 
something of a mirror i n this play. 
If we disregard motivation, Shylock's behavior appears not 
very different from Antonio's. Among other things both are 
law-abiding money-lenders and rather sober and solitary 
wifeless men. Antonio seems real ly close only to Bassanio, 
who leaves h i m (financed by Antonio's money) to go off and 
w i n himself a bride; Shylock is close only to Jessica, who 
leaves h i m (financed by his money) also to marry. If Antonio 
lends Bassanio money without interest, Shylock first lends i t 
(the identical ducats i n fact) to Antonio also without interest 
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and i n the end even forgoes the pr incipal . When Antonio is 
awarded half Shylock's estate he arranges to pass i t at 
Shylock's death to Lorenzo and Jessica; and our last 
intelligence of Shylock is that he is about to turn Chr is t ian , 
having already wi l led his remaining worldly goods to his 
Chr i s t i an son-in-law and convert daughter. Obviously the 
contrast between Shylock and Antonio leans less on deeds 
than on motives: the play distinguishes them for us rather by 
what they would l ike to do than by what they end up being 
responsible for. Antonio voluntar i ly finances Bassanio's 
marriage venture; Jessica must steal her dowry. Antonio 
lends without interest out of love, Shylock out of hate. 
Shylock forgives Antonio's pr incipal , turns Chr is t ian , and 
bequeaths his goods to his only chi ld solely because the l aw 
compels h i m to act i n these ways; Antonio's mercy at the t r i a l 
is free and uncompelled. 
What we see i n action here is the New Testament dialectic 
of love and the law, which are presented there not only as 
antagonistic opposites but as also i n a certain sense two forms 
of one reali ty. If law is external motivation to do good, love as 
caritas is internal motivation toward the same end. Thus i n a 
sense the law is s imply Chr i s t i an love objectified. If you act 
out of love you are no longer "under the law" because your 
acts though lawful are autonomous: the l aw is merely "what 
you w i l l . " Bu t i f your actions express motives contrary to love 
you find yourself facing a law which appears as a menacing 
external enemy. Thus conceived, the law has power only over 
cr iminals who, though they break i t , are not therefore free of 
it: instead violat ion wakes forces of coercion otherwise 
dormant. Jesus and P a u l usual ly dist inguish God's law from 
Caesar's, but P a u l i n his homily on the duty of obedience to 
c iv i l authorities extends the dialectic of law and love to the 
secular order (Rom. 13), and the Reformers took this more 
general interpretation as also the fundamental one. 8 In The 
Merchant of Venice Shakespeare too assimilates his c iv i l and 
cr imina l law to this theological model. 
A t the opening of the t r i a l scene Shylock equates the law 
wi th his own lust for revenge, and the more responsible 
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Venetians reluctantly agree wi th h im . To disarm and unmask 
this perversion of law, Por t ia must at last tu rn the Mosaic 
tables on Shylock and produce her anti-Judaic "quibble". The 
bitter point of this serious joke is that Antonio is not kosher: 
his flesh is bloody and blood is forbidden Shylock by the letter 
of his own "law", his bond, m é t o n y m i e here for the law of 
Moses. 9 A n d despite his clamor that everything not expressly 
spelled out i n i t is inva l id , Shylock evidently has not read his 
bond wi th sufficient care. Bu t the letter of the law turns out 
to be even harder to fulf i l l than to interpret; i n fact i n 
Shylock's case fulfil lment is impossible. A s soon as this lesson 
sinks home Por t ia follows i t wi th a more important one. Even 
i f Shylock could l ive up to i t i n other respects, the law is 
anyway incapable of sanctioning private revenge, which 
contradicts its nature as objectified love. It can only reflect 
the offense back onto the would-be perpetrator's head: for 
having sought another man's life Shylock must forfeit his 
own. Thus the law Shylock had thought one wi th his own 
murderous w i l l is revealed as instead an antagonist, which 
meets h i m i n the magnified image of his own violence. 
B u t although The Merchant of Venice intends to be 
anti-Judaic, i t does not mean to be ant i -Semit ic . 1 0 In fact i n so 
far as the rationale for its attitudes is Paul ine i t is also 
fundamentally anti-racist: Jessica's "race" is no bar to her 
salvation. For to P a u l the old covenant of the flesh (both i n its 
racial sense of descent from common ancestors and i n its 
insistence on mater ial signs of holiness: physical 
circumcision, dietary laws, etc.) is superseded by the new 
covenant of the spirit , wi th its belief i n inheritance through 
faith and its "circumcision of the heart." P a u l , wr i t ing to the 
Romans, worries that recent converts from Juda ism w i l l slide 
back into their old habit of confusing physical symbols, 
external appearances, wi th spir i tual realities. L i t e r a l i sm i n 
its whole range of meanings is thus another aspect of Paul 's 
"Jewish heresy." 
L i t e ra l i sm is the presiding mechanism of Shylock's style of 
mind. Even his speech patterns are shackled by a t r ick of 
l i tera l repetition very l ike the broken-record rhythms of old 
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Justice Shallow, the sterile inversion of Renaissance 
thetorical ideals of "copia" or generous var ia t ion. H i s style 
compulsively explains away its own figures of speech: a 
perfect verbal tic for a miser who, Midas- l ike , has a hard time 
dist inguishing money as symbol from the real wealth i t only 
represents. When other characters i n the play speak of people 
as "dear" and "worthy" or even as "dear bought," they 
understand these terms figuratively, after the "spir i tual 
sense"; only Shylock tries to take such expressions according 
to the "letter". A n d i f "the Spir i t giveth l ife" Shylock's 
despiritualized "letter" threatens to snatch i t away. Thus i n 
III. i . Shylock bewails to Solanio-Salerio the rebell ion of his 
"flesh and blood" (meaning, as he immediately explains, his 
daughter) and complains that Tubal 's gossip of Jessica's 
honeymoon junket "sticks a dagger" i n h i m . Here passion 
constrains h i m to seize the figurative word; but i n the 
subsequent t r ia l scene that word is almost made flesh i n a 
demonic triple parody of circumcision, crucifixion, and 
communion as Shylock does his utmost to stick a l i te ra l 
dagger into Antonio's gentle side and scatter abroad some of 
his l i tera l flesh and blood. The lex talionis i tself seems the 
fitting condemnation of this l i teral is t caricature of reciprocity. 
Shylock's sharply reductive cast of mind shows itself too i n 
his treating people as things to be owned and used, as wel l as 
i n his crafty confounding of mineral wi th an imal breeding. It 
is part ly to forestall the perennial objection to usura as contra 
naturam, which bases i tself on this last confusion, that 
Shylock produces the witness of Jacob's practice on Laban. 
B u t here as everywhere Shylock's defense serves only to 
convict h i m out of his own mouth. He doesn't answer the 
objection at a l l ; instead he reminds his audience of i t . The 
moral of the whole Jacob-Laban story, as Shylock reads i t , is 
that the letter, not the spirit , is a l l that need concern a man: 
"Thrift is blessing i f men steal i t not." A n y t h i n g goes, that is 
to say, short of l i tera l theft. It is against this notion of theft, a 
notion that lets Shylock prosecute a bond whose burden 
approximates the outlaw challenge: "Your money or your 
life!" — it is against this interpretation of what the law allows 
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and disallows that Jessica's theft of love is to be measured and 
judged. 
Jessica's choice appears to be between love and the 
comandment of f i l ia l obedience. Bu t we have already observed 
that from the Chr is t ian viewpoint her father's conception of 
law is perverse. He sees i t as an objectification of the wrong 
k ind of love, of cupiditas not caritas. For Jessica to continue 
obeying his commandments would be to acquiesce i n his 
warped and heretical values. Eros is not caritas either, but as 
romantic love leads to the sacred insti tution of marriage it 
accords with law and is essential to society. 1 1 In Shakespeare, 
as we know, to be anti-marriage is to be anti-social, and 
heavy fathers i n both tragedies and comedies are typically 
petty tyrants and their eloping daughters sympathetic 
heroines. B u t Shylock's sense of Jessica is anti-human as wel l 
as anti-social. He is aware of her as of an i tem of inventory, to 
be locked away with his precious stones, an i tem of great 
sentimental value, l ike Leah's r ing , as precious to h i m as his 
own flesh and blood but wi th no more right to independent 
life than a ducat or one of his own limbs. 
That Shylock has f inal ly to be forced by l aw to leave his 
goods to his daughter and son-in-law should remind us of the 
foreseeable consequences Jessica faces as she makes her 
choice. When she elects to throw down the casket of jewels to 
Lorenzo she also elects to throw down her r ight to inheri t old 
Shylock's ample fortune. So that when she "steals from the 
wealthy Jew" she is not just a thief but equally an heiress 
renouncing a secure c la im to wealth to r i sk an uncertain life 
wi th an impecunious lover. This must I th ink be reckoned a 
version of choosing the lead casket. Nevertheless Jessica does 
disobey her father and she is at least l i te ra l ly a thief. We are 
not to perceive her as a paragon of daughterly conduct: that is 
Portia 's role. B u t she ought to draw more sympathy than 
censure as a well-meaning character caught up i n a moral 
di lemma, who chooses to do a wrong to do a right, a choice 
which, as we shal l see, is made also by Bassanio. 
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III 
Port ia , l ike other heroines of the early comedies, shows a 
strong histrionic bent. She loves to hold the mirror up to 
human nature just as her father did i n the casket contest. She 
seems unable, i n fact, to resist g i ld ing even his l i l y . The 
casket scenes designed by h i m are surely theatrical enough, 
wi th their part ing curtain and gl i t ter ing symbolic props, their 
bui l t - in reversals and recognitions. Y e t when Bassanio comes 
to choose, Portia 's excited imaginat ion cannot refrain from 
casting the scene and its characters against a musical 
backdrop, into the allegorical postures of a court masque of 
Hercules and Hesione (III. i . 53-62). The dressing-up is only 
verbal here but at the t r ia l Por t ia puts on the actual 
appearance of law and, as we have seen, aims its mirror at the 
violence of Shylock's w i l l ; i n the r i ng scene she again shows a 
character the image of his vice so that i n passing judgment on 
another he may judge and so amend himself. 
We recall that i n the casket and t r i a l scenes, a l l more or 
less stage-managed by Por t ia , we have observed characters 
first self-deceived by distorted self-images, then abruptly 
confronted by reflections of truer selves. B u t to understand 
how an analogous double-take informs the r i ng scene we must 
first review the t r ia l from a s l ight ly different angle. 
When Por t ia tells Shylock he may have his pound of flesh 
but no jot of "Chr is t ian blood," he asks: "Is that the law?" 
"Thyself shalt see the act" is her repy — which seems to 
indicate that she has already "seen the act" herself, since she 
knows its content and location. A n d i f we grant that Por t ia 
enters the scene knowing at least this way to block Shylock's 
attempt at legalized murder, there is real ly no reason to resist 
the companion assumption that Bel lar io has "furnished her 
wi th [his] opinion" on the other two laws as wel l . W h y then 
doesn't she just tel l Shylock at once the t ruth of his legal 
position? If we could ask Por t ia , who quotes Shylock the 
Lord's Prayer, she might respond by quoting us Christ 's 
explanation that he employs parables because i n this way "is 
fulfil led the prophecy of Esaias, which prophecy saith, B y 
hearing, ye shall hear, and shall not perceive." 1 2 Bu t the 
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dramatic reason seems to be l ike father l ike daughter: she 
wants to give Shylock the chance to make his free choice and 
to set h i m up a mirror to show h i m the inmost parts of 
whatever self he chooses. If she were to explain to h i m at once 
how his bond could become his own death warrant, he would 
tear i t up and both he and Antonio would be physical ly safe. 
B u t his chance to choose the lead casket, caritas rather than 
cupiditas, would be utterly lost. The only choice left h i m that 
would not further his self-interest would be the insane 
decision to execute his bond, carve out Antonio's heart, and 
knowingly thereby sentence himself to death. H e is finally 
offered this choice, but not un t i l he has been given every 
chance to give and thus to receive absolute forgiveness: the 
giv ing and the receiving being complementary interpretations 
of the same judgment. 
B u t this free moral choice Por t ia insists on offering 
everyone is always depicted by Shakespeare as consequential 
and as based on par t ia l ignorance, hence as r i sky. Shylock, 
ignorant of his own ignorance, thinks he can judge others 
without r isk to himself: he is made to see how hazardous 
judgment is and that i t is always reflexive: "For wi th what 
judgment ye judge, ye shal l be judged." "To offend and judge 
are distinct offices" as Por t ia says; but Shakespeare 
habi tual ly contrives to have them performed by the same 
agent so that the judge may unknowingly judge and sentence 
himself. Othello and Angelo and Lear are conspicuous victims 
of this moral boomerang; but the process is ingrained i n 
Shakespeare's imaginat ion and some example of i t gets into 
almost every play. The principle is the complement of the 
golden rule: do not unto others as you would not have them do 
unto you . 1 3 Shylock does not want to give up his own life (he 
finally prefers humil ia t ion) , yet he demands Antonio's . On the 
other side, Antonio does not sentence Shylock to anything he 
would not want for himself, including the conversion. To a 
twentieth-century audience Antonio may seem to be 
demanding that Shylock merely shed — or worse, betray — 
one rel igion for another, where both are equally va l id . These 
are surely things Antonio would refuse to do himself. B u t 
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Shakespeare would have expected his contemporaries to 
perceive a different situation. He would have expected them 
to see Antonio as requir ing Shylock to adopt the unique sure 
means to his soul's salvation — which is something Antonio 
indeed would do — has done — himself. 
If Shylock had chosen mercy when Por t ia begged h i m to he 
could have walked out of the courtroom wi th his life, his 
goods, and his rel igion a l l apparently intact. Bu t this choice, 
i f genuine, would actually have amounted to a de facto 
conversion to the play's vision of pr imary Chr is t iani ty . 
Shylock of course remains true to himself i n his 
self-destructive fashion. A n d forced conversion thus becomes 
inevitable, the reflexive reductio ad absurdum of the major 
pattern i n the play which shows Shylock never doing anyone 
a good turn unless he is made to. For though Shylock's 
conversion is part of the consequences of his or iginal ly free 
choice and therefore cannot itself be free i n the same sense, i t 
does hold its own k ind of freedom. A s Mars i l i o Fic ino explains 
the principle, the evi l man "converts blessings into evi l for 
h i m s e l f whereas the good man "converts evils into good for 
himself ." 1 4 Thus Antonio profits spi r i tual ly from facing up to 
imminent death; and Shylock has the option of t ru ly 
embracing his new rel igion and its gift of eternal salvation. 
B u t we feel sure he w i l l characteristically convert what could 
have been his greatest blessing, his baptism, into a means of 
self-damnation. Attempts to interpret this as the planned 
result of some k ind of hypocritical Chr i s t i an entrapment 
would seem to be misguided: a faked conversion would be seen 
by Shakespeare's neighbors as endangering Shylock's soul no 
more than his simply remaining a Jew (Acts 4:11-12). 
Antonio's st ipulation seems rather to offer Shylock an 
opportunity he probably w i l l not accept and at the same time 
to demand an outward conformity that w i l l make i t at least 
less easy for h i m to go on openly t ak ing advantage of what 
was thought of as his Jewish license to commit usury (Deut. 
23). 
It was Mrs . Jameson, followed i n this century by E . M . W . 
T i l l y a r d and others, who first noted that Por t ia i n her 
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"quality of mercy" speech is actually pleading for Shylock not 
Antonio. Antonio is already safe when Por t ia starts her 
pleading: only Shylock can profit from the destruction of his 
bond. It is not Antonio's flesh that needs saving but Shylock's 
soul. Both Mrs . Jameson and T i l l y a r d however assume that 
Shakespeare requires his audience to be aware of this actual 
s i tuat ion. 1 5 1 want to suggest instead that the scene may well 
be arranged to provoke a more complex response than this. 
For Shakespeare has apparently rigged the t r i a l so that i t can 
be construed i n two mutual ly exclusive ways. It seems, i n 
fact, to have been made easy to misunderstand, hard to see 
t ruly. A word from Por t ia could have prevented a l l possibility 
of audience misunderstanding. B u t Shakespeare withholds 
the word. On the first acquaintance then, when we do not 
know what Por t ia knows, we are invi ted to accept as our own 
the Venet ian view, seeing the danger as Antonio's , fearing 
Shylock's fury and the privilege of his knife, cheering the 
sudden rescue of Antonio by Por t ia and her equally sudden 
defeat of Shylock. We are thus drawn into a vicarious 
participation i n the Venetians ' anxiety for their neighbor's 
life and encouraged to share wi th them the melodramatic 
t h r i l l of Portia 's long-delayed "Tarry, Jew," which overturns 
the situation, hands Antonio Shylock's opportunity for 
vengeance or mercy, and makes Shylock taste Antonio's 
bankruptcy and sentence of death. B u t wi th hindsight and 
after considering the total pattern of the play's evidence, we 
find ourselves instead looking through this surface 
melodrama and real iz ing that the danger is always actually 
to and from Shylock, who defeats, judges, and sentences 
himself. A n d once we penetrate to this inner meaning, our 
former view can remain appropriate only to Shylock and the 
Venetians: we cannot ourselves return to i t . Thus, on this 
interpretation, the t r i a l may be thought of as l i ke one of 
Belmont's caskets, wi th a deceptive outside whose apparent 
significance is reversed by what is concealed wi th in . So 
conceived, i t offers a hazardous mirror to audiences: for 
whoever wi th Grat iano judges this complex structure a 
melodrama simultaneously judges the depth of his own 
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understanding of it. It is the author of the play who now 
seems to by saying of the Gratianos i n his audience: " i n them 
is fulfil led the prophecy of Esaias. . . ." I am suggesting then 
that i n the t r i a l scene Shakespeare constructed a dramatic 
event that would offer his audience a first-hand experience of 
the k i n d of double-take they had thought they were merely 
observing. A n d l ike the "good" characters i n his play 
Shakespeare as artist would also be committ ing himself to the 
same gamble of faith. The hazard of his enterprise (to use the 
mercantile metaphor) would be that his audience, even the 
most perceptive, might fai l to catch on, i n which case his 
ingenious dramatic structure along wi th its moral point 
would be lost. Bu t this is the ordinary r i sk of the parabolist, 
and Renaissance poets, wi th Por t ia , were disposed to accept i t 
as proper to serious mimesis . 1 6 
B u t what is concealed i n the t r i a l scene (however we 
interpret it) is revealed i n the r ing scene. Here we share wi th 
Por t ia and Nerissa the information — that they were the 
lawyer and clerk — necessary to see a l l points of view and 
spot the l imi ts of each. The t r i a l scene repeats the lesson of 
the caskets that judgment is a mirror and shows too that the 
only escape from the destructive circuit of retr ibutive justice 
is through forgiveness: not a forgiveness that negates the 
law's necessary consequences but a forgiveness that fulfills 
the law's spirit , which is essentially educational: the law 
being, according to P a u l , our school-master to Chris t . This is 
the k ind of mercy Antonio extends to Shylock i n act four and 
it is the k ind Por t ia extends to Bassanio i n act five. 
The r ing test catches Bassanio i n a double-bind. H e ought 
to give and hazard everything he has for love (give the r ing — 
his c la im to Belmont and Por t ia — for love of Antonio) yet he 
ought also to keep faith wi th his bride whom he also loves. 
Bassanio meets here for the first t ime the sort of ordeal that 
Por t ia and Jessica have already undergone: the psychic 
tug-of-war between equal and apparently mutual ly exclusive 
loves, wi th their divergent obligations. H i s conflict is closer to 
Portia's than to Jessica's i n its balanced intensity: there is no 
Shylock on either hand to obscure the delicacy of his 
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predicament. Bu t his solution is more l ike Jessica's. Por t ia 
alone is able to resolve the di lemma through obedience to a 
father whose w i l l is i n perfect unison wi th her own. Jessica 
and Bassanio do wrong to do right. Jessica breaks faith wi th 
her father and steals a r ing given h i m by his wife which she 
prodigally spends for a love trifle. Bassanio spends his wife's 
r ing for a far worthier purpose, to repay his debt of love to 
Antonio; but he nevertheless thus gives away his c la im to his 
new fortunes at Belmont and takes a very great r i sk on his 
bride's reaction when she learns he has been false to his word. 
Bassanio has failed to realize that even g iv ing has a l imi t , 
that holding on — constancy — is also among love's values. 
A n d he has also failed to understand the dialectic of justice 
and mercy, as we learn during the t r i a l when he asks 
Port ia-Balthasar to "wrest the law" and do wrong to do a 
right. The answer he receives then is that this "must not be." 
Ye t this is the principle that governs his decision after the 
t r i a l to forswear himself and surrender his wedding r ing. In 
act five he must learn by personal experience what Shylock's 
example might more comfortably have taught h i m : a wrong, 
even a smal l one, is always a wrong and calls forth its own 
punishment automatically, for, as we have seen, the law 
sleeps only un t i l offended, when i t reacts by reflecting the 
offense i n k ind . The law has no power to make anyone choose 
to do right; i t can only punish those who do wrong. A s wi th 
A d a m and Everyman: the original choice or judgment is free, 
its consequences are not. The consequences are what the 
law-breaker deserves, mere justice (dike). A n d though one's 
freely-chosen attitude toward unavoidable consequences can 
transform them, making vir tue of necessity, the only 
transcendence of the mechanical rigor of desert i tself is by 
way of g iv ing , forgiving, mercy. 
Por t ia responds to Bassanio's decision i n what we may 
recognize as typical Belmont family style: she offers h i m a 
l i t t le dramatic lesson, us ing highly-polished equivocation as 
her mirror. F i r s t she uses her art to tel l h i m the p la in truth: 
" I ' l l die for't, but some woman had the ring" (V. i . 208), that 
hearing he may hear and not understand. Next she produces 
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the r ing , flashing h i m an image of his own indiscretion i n her 
verbal portrait of herself as adultress, thus apparently 
trading places with h im , hoist ing h i m suddenly to the seat of 
judgment and casting herself into the role of gui l ty suppliant: 
"Pardon me Bassanio,/ For by this r i ng the doctor lay wi th 
me" (11. 258-9). Bassanio's understandable "amazement" 
achieves no verbal expression, but Portia 's expectation i n 
showing h i m a magnified double of his fault is quite 
conventional: his conscience, fundamentally sound, w i l l be 
soundly wrung and w i l l re turn his judgment onto himself so 
that he may amend his own smaller inf ide l i ty . 1 7 
B u t just at this b r ink of moral gravity Por t ia redeems the 
comic mood and rends her ve i l of i l lus ion . Her adequate 
response to the violat ion of her bond avoids Shylock's empty 
l i tera l ism, dist inguishing nicely between the symbol (the 
ring) and what i t represents (herself and her wealth). 
Bassanio's offense i n yielding the r ing remained symbolic, so 
must its chastisement. Moreover the very offense was 
simultaneously a gesture of generosity and renunciation of 
self i n recognition of which his punishment is now revealed to 
be also his reward. W i t h the sudden flourish of the stage 
magician Por t ia flips the leaden casket of adultery inside out 
and shows that i t has a l l along concealed a forgiving and 
faithful wife, this time the th ing itself and not a painter's 
iconic symbol. The case of Shylock's bond is played back i n 
reverse. The same words that a moment ago had guaranteed 
Portia 's infidelity now, echoed by Bassanio, guarantee her 
constancy: 
Sweet doctor, you shall be my bedfellow. 
When I am absent, then lie with my wife. 
(V. i. 284-85) 
This whole elaborate joke is possible only because the law, 
the "doctor" who "saved" Antonio, was i n real i ty only an 
outward disguise of love. A n d l ike her other feats of Chr i s t i an 
magic Portia's last i l lus ion is created and dispelled by the 
mainly verbal looking-glass of her entertaining and 
instructive art. 
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NOTES 
'Citations of Shakespeare's plays are from Sylvan Barnet (ed.), The Complete 
Signet Classic Shakespeare (New York: Harcourt Brace 1972). 
"Bassanio's name seems not to be the same kind of vernacular pun as the 
names of the other suitors. Nevertheless, as Northrop Frye pointed out 
in Anatomy of Criticism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 
166, it is fitting that the name of the only suitor to judge truly among 
the symbolic metals should resemble a Greek word for touchstones 
(basanoi). And it may even be intentional that the first syllable of 
Bassanio's name should in Shakespeare's pronunciation have the sound 
of English base — as in the key phrase "base lead" — with its 
appropriately conflicting meanings of "worthless," 'Toundation," and 
"humble." 
3Matt. 5:42. Bible citations are from the Geneva version, spelling modernized. 
For an account of Antonio's progress from a self-righteous piety that 
cannot love its enemy to a closer approximation of true Christian 
charity, see Barbara K. Lewalski's "Biblical Allusion and Allegory in 
The Merchant of Venice," SQ, 13 (1962), 330-1. 
'Portia explains to Lorenzo the Neoplatonic principle of the like souls of true 
lovers at III. iv. 11-21. 
5I mean hamartia here to include both Aristotelian "error" and Pauline "sin." 
aHam. II. i i . 536-7. Hamlet of course was educated at Wittenberg; Aragon is a 
Spanish Catholic. 
'See also Isabella to Angelo in MM II. ii. 74-8. 
8See Krister Stendahl, "The Apostle Paul and the Introspective Conscience of 
the West," Harvard Theological Review, 56 (1963), 205-6. 
"Geoffrey Bullough (ed.), Narrative and Dramatic Sources of Shakespeare 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957), I, 448, n. 1. On the imagery 
of cannibalism that accompanies Shylock through the play see Leslie 
Fiedler, The Stranger in Shakespeare (New York: Stein and Day, 1972), 
pp. 110-11. 
'"Perhaps it always ought to be mentioned that the "Judaism" portrayed in 
The Merchant of Venice expresses an inaccurate idea of historical 
Judaism, especially as contrasted with historical Christianity. 
Shakespeare's conception of "Judaism" is derived mainly from Paul's 
propagandist distortions. There is no room here to rehearse the 
inaccuracies of that view, but its limits may perhaps be sufficiently 
indicated by recalling that the New Testament's " "Vengeance is mine,' 
saith the Lord" is a quotation from the Torah and that the golden rule 
was taught in its complementary form (see p. 16 below) by Rabbi Hillel 
Hanasi, elder contemporaty of Philo, before the birth of Christ (see The 
Talmud of Jerusalem [New York: Wisdom Library, 1956 J, pp. 26-7). 
""For charity itself fulfils the law,/ And who can sever love from charity?" 
(LLL IV. iii. 361-2): in its Renaissance context Berowne's coup de grace 
to the court's oath of abstinence is not altogether fool. 
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1 2Matt. 13:14. A somewhat different application of this text to The Merchant 
of Venice was made by Neville Coghill, "The Basis of Shakespearean 
Comedy," in Essays and Studies of the English Association (1950), p. 23. 
The idea of course is a commonplace of Renaissance defenses of poetry. 
Cf., e.g., Sir Philip Sidney, An Apologie for Poetrie, in Elizabethan 
Critical Essays, ed. G. Gregory Smith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1904), I, 
166 and Sir John Harington, A Preface, or rather a Briefe Apologie of 
Poetrie, prefixed to the edition of Orlando Furioso 1591, also in Smith, II, 
205-6. 
, 3 Sir Walter Ralegh calls this "the law of Nature incorrupt" in The History of 
The World, ed. C A . Patrides (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 
1971), p. 193. 
l 4 Paul Oskar Kristeller, The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino (Gloucester, Mass.: 
P. Smith, 1964), p. 365. 
1 5 Mrs. Jameson, Characteristics of Women: Moral, Poetical, and Historical 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1888), p. 64; E.M.W. Tillyard, "The Trial 
Scene in The Merchant of Venice," REL, 2 (1961), 54-56; Bertrand 
Evans, Shakespeare's Comedies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), 
pp. 63-64. 
"Sidney's Apologie in Smith, I, 206. For the doctrine of poem as parable with 
several layers of intelligibility suited to the various capacities of its 
audience see Harington's Preface in Smith, II, 203-6. 
"The Renaissance mirror of art normally has a moral as well as mimetic 
function. Hamlet is explicit on both points: Ham. II. i i . 596-9, III. i . 
20-24. See also Lily B. Campbell, Shakespeare's Tragic Heroes: Slaves of 
Passion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1930), pp. 25-38. 
